The Supreme Court held that a person who is ineligible under Section 29A of the IBC to submit a resolution plan, cannot propose a scheme of compromise and arrangement under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013.
The bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and MR Shah also upheld the constitutional validity of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, which stipulate that a person who is not eligible under the IBC to submit a resolution plan for insolvency resolution of the corporate debtor shall not be a party in any manner to such compromise or arrangement.
The Supreme Court observed thus while dismissing the appeals against National Company Law Appellate Tribunal and also a writ petition challenging constitutional validity of Regulation 2B Of Liquidation Process Regulations. NCLT, in these cases, held that a person who is ineligible under Section 29A of the IBC to submit a resolution plan, is also barred from proposing a scheme of compromise and arrangement under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013.
Observed upon the entire gamut of proceedings contemplated under that statute. The second point to be noted is that one of the modes of revival in the course of the liquidation process is envisaged in the enabling provisions of Section 230 of the Act of 2013, to which recourse can be taken by the liquidator appointed under Section 34 of the IBC. The third point is that the statutorily contemplated activities of the liquidator do not cease while inviting a scheme of compromise or arrangement under Section 230.
The appointment of the liquidator in an IBC liquidation is provided in Section 34 and their duties are specified in Section 35. In taking recourse to the provisions of Section 230 of the Act of 2013, the liquidator appointed under the IBC is , above all, to attempt a revival of the corporate debt or so as to save it from the prospect of a corporate death. The consequence of the approval of the scheme of revival or compromise, and its sanction thereafter by the Tribunal under Sub-section (6), is that the scheme attains a binding character upon stakeholders including the liquidator who has been appointed under the IBC.
In this back drop, it is difficult to accept the submission of Mr Bajaj that Section 230 of the Act of 2013 is a standalone provision which has no connect with the provisions of the IBC. Undoubtedly, Section 230 of the Act of 2013 is wider in its ambit in the sense that it is not conned only to a company in liquidation or to corporate debt or which is being wound up under Chapter III of the IBC. Obviously, therefore, the rigors of the IBC will not apply to proceedings under Section 230 of the Act of 2013 where the scheme of compromise or arrangement proposed is in relation to an entity which is not the subject of a proceeding under the IBC. But, when, as in the present case, the process of invoking the provisions of Section 230 of the Act of 2013 traces its origin or , as it may be described, the trigger to the liquidation proceedings which have been initiated under the IBC, it becomes necessary to read both sets of provisions in harmony.
A harmonious construction between the two statutes would ensure that while on the one hand a scheme of compromise or arrangement under Section 230 is being pursued, this takes place in a manner which is consistent with the underlying principles of the IBC because the scheme is proposed in respect of an entity which is undergoing liquidation under Chapter III of the IBC.
As such, the company has to be protected from its management and a corporate death. It would lead to a manifest absurdity if the very persons who are ineligible for submitting a resolution plan, participating in the sale of assets of the company in liquidation or participating in the sale of the corporate debt or as a ‘going concern ‘, are somehow permitted to propose a compromise or arrangement under Section 230 of the Act of 2013.
The Supreme Court, also rejected the contention that attaching the ineligibilities under Section 29A and Section 35(1)(f) of the IBC to a scheme of compromise and arrangement under Section 230 of the Act of 2013 would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the appellant would be “deemed ineligible” to submit a proposal under Section 230 of the Act of 2013.
The court also rejected the contention that Section 35(1)(f) applies only to a liquidator who conducts a sale of the property of the corporate debtor in liquidation but not to the NLCT, acting as the Tribunal, when it exercises its powers under Section 230 of the Companies Act 2013.
The main ground of challenge to Regulation 2B was that the regulation transgressed the authority of IBBI by introducing a disqualification or ineligibility in regard to the presentation of an application for a scheme of compromise or arrangement under Section 230 of the Companies Act.
Dismissing the appeals, the bench concluded thus:
Based on the above analysis, we and that the prohibition placed by the Parliament in Section 29A and Section 35(1 )(f ) of the IBC must also attach itself to a scheme of compromise or arrangement under Section 230 of the Act of 2013, when the company is undergoing liquidation under the auspices of the IBC. As such, Regulation 2B of the Liquidation Process Regulations, specifically the proviso to Regulation 2B(1), is also constitutionally valid.
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